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Abstract
Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from in-
formational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While
standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can
verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in ex-
periments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous dis-
tributional preferences as the main cause and design a parsimonious
experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as
either selfish, efficiency loving, inequality averse, inequality loving or
competitive. Results show that most subjects exhibit non-standard
distributional preferences, among which efficiency-loving and inequal-
ity aversion are most frequent. We discuss implications for institu-
tional design and agent selection in credence goods markets.
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1 Introduction
Credence goods markets suffer from informational asymmetries between ex-
pert sellers and customers, because customers are unable to identify the
quality they need, whereas expert sellers are able to do so. Darby and Karni
(1973) added credence goods to Nelson’s (1970) classification of ordinary,
search and experience goods, and mention provision of repair services as typ-
ical example. Other important examples of credence goods are health care
provision, financial consulting, or sales services of technical equipment.
The informational asymmetries on credence goods markets may cause a
variety of inefficiencies. Depending on informational conditions and prices for
different qualities, expert sellers may have a material self interest to provide
unnecessarily high quality (a case referred to as ”overtreatment”), or insuf-
ficiently low quality (”undertreatment”), or to charge for a higher quality
than provided (”overcharging”). Such inefficiencies are not only a theoreti-
cal possibility, but are well documented in the literature. A survey conducted
by the Department of Transportation indicates that more than half of car
repairs are unnecessary, which is an indication of overtreatment (Wolinsky
1993, 1995). Schneider (2006) presents a field study on fraudulent behavior
in the auto repair business. He finds substantial evidence of all three kinds of
fraud, (i) overtreatment (in the form of completely unnecessary repairs), (ii)
undertreatment (by neglecting defects that require urgent attention), and
(iii) overcharging (billing for parts and labor not provided). Referring to
the medical sector, Gruber and Owings (1996) or Gruber, Kim and Mayzlin
(1999) show that the relative frequency of Cesarean deliveries compared to
normal child births depends on the fee differentials of health insurance pro-
grams for both types of treatments, despite these differentials being unrelated
to medical indication. Hence, monetary incentives matter for the provision
of health care and for the type of inefficiency arising in market equilibrium.1
A common finding in the theoretical literature is that introducing verifia-
bility ensures efficiency on credence goods markets. Verifiability is defined to
apply when an expert seller cannot charge for a treatment quality that has
not been provided.2 If verifiability applies, experts are predicted to choose
1Experimental evidence on inefficiencies in credence goods markets is presented in Dul-
leck, Kerschbamer and Sutter (2009), while the related studies by Huck, Lünser and Tyran
(2006, 2007) focus on experience goods (goods —like wine— where the quality cannot be
observed ex ante but is perfectly observable ex post, i.e. after consumption).
2Verifiability of the provided treatment quality is likely to hold in many important
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prices for different quality levels that induce them to provide the appropri-
ate quality of the credence good. As a consequence, consumers - inferring
experts’ incentives from posted prices - decide to interact.3
In this paper we present the results of laboratory experiments with en-
dogenous price choices by experts showing that - contrary to the theoretical
predictions - verifiability is of little help in promoting efficiency on credence
goods markets. In fact, we find that the relative frequencies of market inter-
action, undertreatment and overtreatment do not differ significantly between
two experimental conditions that are identical except that verifiability ap-
plies in one condition, but not the other.4 The aggregate performance in
both conditions is better than the standard prediction for a market with-
out verifiability, but worse than the standard prediction for a market with
verifiability. These findings raise two important research questions: Why is
the performance on credence goods markets so poor even in the presence of
verifiability? And why is the performance of credence goods markets without
institutional safeguards against fraud (i.e. without verifiability) so much bet-
ter than predicted? While this paper’s main focus is on the former question,
we will explain below that our results also help to answer the latter one.
We start by presenting evidence indicating that non-standard distribu-
tional preferences play an important rule for the behavior of market par-
credence goods markets. In some cases, for example pest control, equipment repair and
dental services, the customer is present during treatment and can ensure that services
charged for are actually provided. In other cases verifiability is secured indirectly through
the provision of ex post evidence. For instance, before stricter hygienic rules were enacted
in hospitals, it was not uncommon for surgeons performing gall stone extractions to pro-
vide the extracted stones to the patient after the operation to show that the suggested
intervention had actually been performed (and to prove that it was necessary). Similarly,
in today’s automobile repair market, it is quite common that broken parts are handed
over to the customer to substantiate the claim (on the bill) that replacement, and not
only repair, has been performed.
3Theoretical studies investigating credence goods markets under verifiability include
Emons (1997 and 2001), Alger and Salanié (2002), Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), and
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2008 and 2009). See Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for a
unifying model and a survey of the literature.
4These two experimental conditions are also included in a companion paper (Dulleck
et al. 2009) where we investigate with a total of 16 experimental treatments the role
of liability, verifiability, competition and reputation on the frequency of trade and the
efficiency on credence goods markets. In the companion paper we do not address the issue
of how distributional preferences affect provision behavior, nor do we present a test for
identifying distributional preferences of experts (as we do here).
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ticipants in our endogenous price choice experiments. Motivated by these
findings we proceed with a thorough theoretical analysis of the impact of
distributional preferences on the provision behavior of experts under verifi-
ability. Based on our theoretical results that require minimal assumptions
and do not rely on any structural assumption on experts’ utility or motiva-
tion function (such as linearity, or convexity or whatsoever), we then design
a parsimonious experiment allowing us to classify experimental sellers’ dis-
tributional preferences as either selfish, inequality averse, efficiency loving,
inequality loving or competitive. Our experimental design relies on exoge-
nously given prices for different quality levels of a credence good rather than
letting sellers decide endogenously as in the first set of experiments. The
main advantage of using a fixed price design is that it enables us to elicit
an expert’s willingness to pay for the implementation of her preferred payoff
distribution while avoiding endogeneity problems of certain types choosing
particular price vectors.
We implement our experiment and find that the behavior of a large ma-
jority of subjects is consistent with either a taste for efficiency (in the spirit
of Charness and Rabin 2002) or inequality aversion (in the spirit of Fehr and
Schmidt 1999, or Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). Only about 20% of subjects
behave as standard theory predicts.
How do these findings relate to the above mentioned research questions?
The key insight is that one and the same heterogeneity in distributional pref-
erences can lead to a positive or a negative deviation from standard theory’s
prediction depending on institutional design and - within a given design - on
the price vector under which the transaction takes place. We will argue that
without verifiability the negative side of distributional preferences cannot
lead to a deviation from standard theory’s prediction while the positive side
can and does. With verifiability exactly the opposite is true. In sum, the net
effect of distributional preferences is positive in markets without verifiability,
but negative with verifiability, leading to both markets performing equally
(well or poor) in the aggregate.
More generally speaking, our results show that distributional preferences
can have both considerable up- and downside effects on efficiency in mar-
kets with asymmetric information. This confirms earlier findings of Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) and Fehr, Gaechter and Kirchsteiger (1997).
Fehr et al. (1993) document that fairness preferences can prevent market
clearing in labour markets, while the results in Fehr et al. (1997) show that
social preferences can increase - rather than decrease - efficiency in a labour
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market with incomplete contracts. Our results add to the existing literature
the important insight that institutions need to be robust against the dark
side of distributional preferences of market participants in order to achieve
efficiency. In credence goods markets verifiability does not meet this require-
ment despite standard theory’s predictions.
In sum, our paper contributes to the existing literature in four dimensions.
First it presents a thorough theoretical analysis of the impact of distribu-
tional preferences on expert provision behavior under verifiability. Secondly,
it develops a parsimonious experiment that allows classifying experimental
experts as either selfish, inequality averse, efficiency loving, inequality loving
or competitive using minimal assumptions. Third, it applies the parsimo-
nious experimental design (with exogenous prices) in the lab and shows that
a substantial part of the subject population exhibits non-standard prefer-
ences. And forth, it discusses the implications of heterogeneity in distrib-
utional preferences for institutional design and agent selection in credence
goods markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the basic setup of a credence goods market and then presents standard
predictions and the experimental results of two treatments with endogenous
prices which only differ with respect to the presence or absence of verifiability.
There we also discuss evidence indicating that distributional preferences are
important determinants of market participants’ behavior. In Section 3 we,
first, investigate theoretically the behavioral implications of two competing
models of other-regarding preferences, one based on preferences for efficiency
and one based on inequality aversion. Second, we extend our focus to a more
general discussion on the impact of different kinds of distributional prefer-
ences on provision and charging behavior in credence goods markets. This
discussion culminates in the design of the parsimonious experiment which
is then implemented in Section 4 to classify expert sellers in different dis-
tributional types according to their provision behavior. Section 5 concludes
with a discussion of our results and their implications for institutional design
(institutions should be robust against the coexistence of different types of
agents) and agent selection (selecting the right agents converts verifiability
into a robust institution, in the sense that it performs well even under cost
uncertainty - a case largely ignored in the theoretical literature).
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2 The Role of Verifiability in Credence Goods
Markets: A Simple Model, Standard The-
ory’s Predictions and Experimental Evidence
This section introduces a simple model of a credence goods market and shows
how verifiability should affect behavior according to predictions based on
standard preferences (i.e., assuming that rational subjects maximize their
own material payoffs). It then presents experimental evidence showing that
verifiability does not have the predicted effects and indicating that non-
standard distributional preferences shape the behavior of market partici-
pants.
2.1 Basic Model
Consumers are ex ante identical. Using a medical farming, we assume that
customers need a major treatment (th) with probability h, and a minor treat-
ment (tl) with probability 1− h. Each consumer (he) is randomly matched
with one seller (she) who sets prices ph and pl for the major, respectively
minor, treatment (with ph ≥ pl). The seller has costs ch for the major treat-
ment, and cl for the minor one (with ch > cl).
The consumer only knows the prices for the different treatments, but not
the type of treatment that he needs, when he makes his decision whether or
not to interact with the seller. In case of interaction, the seller gets to know
which type of treatment the customer needs. Then she provides one of the
two treatments and charges one of the two prices.
Customers in need of the minor treatment tl are sufficiently treated in
any case (both if the seller chooses tl and if she chooses th). However, if
the customer needs the major treatment th, then only th is sufficient. A
sufficient treatment yields a value v > 0 for the customer, an insufficient
treatment yields a value of zero. If the customer decides against interaction
then both the customer and the seller receive an outside option of o ≥ 0.
In case of an interaction, the monetary payoff for the consumer is the value
from being treated minus the price to be paid, whereas the seller receives as a
monetary payoff the price charged minus the costs of the treatment provided.
More formally, let θ ∈ {l, h} be the index of a customer’s type of problem,
µ ∈ {l, h} the index of the quality of treatment provided, and κ ∈ {l, h} the
index of the quality of treatment charged for. Then the material payoff of
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Figure 1: The Credence Goods Game
the seller in case of interaction is
πs(p
l, ph, µ, κ) = pκ − cµ (1)
while the consumer’s material payoff in case of interaction is
πc(p
l, ph, θ, µ, κ) = v − pκ if θ ≤ µ and − pκ otherwise.5 (2)
Figure 1 presents this game. Note, this simple game captures all the idio-
syncratic problems of credence goods markets discussed earlier. If a customer
needs high quality, i.e. on the third stage nature moves left, and the seller
treats with tl, we have a situation of undertreatment, if he needs low quality
and the seller treats with th we have overtreatment ; and if the seller charges
ph when treatment tl was provided, we have a situation of overcharging.
5Here we use the convention that l ≤ h, but not vice versa.
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2.2 Experimental Design
To understand the role of verifiability, we compare two experimental condi-
tions.6 In one - condition N - we impose no verifiability and in the other -
condition V - we impose verifiability. Condition N is exactly as described
above and depicted in Figure 1. Verifiability means that consumers are able
to observe and verify ex post the treatment that has been provided by the
seller (without knowing, however, whether this treatment is the appropri-
ate one). Therefore, condition V is identical to condition N, except that
the last stage is degenerate because the expert has to charge the price for
the provided treatment. This means verifiability prevents overcharging (and
undercharging), but it does not preclude over- and/or undertreatment.
In both experimental conditions we let the customer’s probability of need-
ing the major treatment be h = 0.5, and the value of a sufficient treatment
be v = 10. The costs of providing the minor, respectively major, treatment
are cl = 2, and ch = 6. The prices posted by the sellers, pl and ph (with
pl ≤ ph), have to be chosen in integer numbers from the interval {1, 11}. The
outside option if no trade takes place between the seller and the customer is
set to o = 1.6.
We always use matching groups of eight subjects each, which is common
knowledge in all conditions. Four subjects in each matching group are in the
role of customers, and four in the role of sellers. The assignment to roles is
randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment, and roles are kept
fixed throughout the entire experiment. There are 16 periods of interaction
in which we use a stranger matching with random rematching of experts and
customers after each period to avoid an opportunity for reputation building.7
All experimental sessions were run computerized using zTree (Fischbacher
2007) and recruiting was done via ORSEE (Greiner 2004). A total of 184
subjects participated in this set of experiments, most of them studying eco-
nomics, business administration, and social and life sciences. All sessions
started with an extensive description of the game. All parameters as well
as the matching procedure were made common knowledge to all participants
by reading them aloud. Before the experiment started, participants had to
6Since in our model we let sellers provide a ”treatment” to customers we refer to
experimental treatments as conditions throughout the article.
7Of course, the probability of meeting a particular expert again is one quarter, meaning
that implicit reputation formation that encompasses the whole matching group is feasible.
However, the stranger matching precludes reputation formation of individual experts.
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answer a set of control questions correctly to ensure that they had fully un-
derstood the instructions. The average session length was 1.5 hours, and
subjects earned on average 15 Euro.
2.3 Standard Predictions and the Role of Verifiability
Standard theory (relying on rational, own-money-maximizing, risk-neutral
agents) predicts that without verifiability the expert will always charge the
higher price ph and always provide the cheaper treatment tl. Anticipating
this consumers will only accept if ph ≤ (1− h)v − o = 3.4. But with such a
ph even a defrauding expert earns less than the value of her outside option
(because (1− h)v − cl < 2o). Thus, in condition N standard theory predicts
that the market breaks down (on the equilibrium path). Furthermore, if -
for whatever reason - a transaction takes place (off the equilibrium path), we
should observe undertreatment and overcharging:
Prediction 1a (Condition N) Consider Condition N. Assume that
subjects have standard preferences. Then no interaction will take place (on
the equilibrium path), and if an interaction takes place (off the equilibrium
path) then the expert seller provides tl and charges ph.
In condition V the expert cannot charge for a treatment other than the
provided one and the provided treatment depends on the mark-up pi − ci,
i ∈ {l, h}. To characterize the provision behavior of own-money-maximizing
experts under this condition it is useful to distinguish the following types of
price vectors:
• an equal mark-up price-vector is defined as one that satisfies ph− ch =
pl − cl;
• an undertreatment price-vector satisfies ph − ch < pl − cl; and
• an overtreatment price-vector is characterized by ph − ch > pl − cl.
Under equal mark-up price vectors own-money-maximizing sellers provide
the appropriate treatment8, and they provide always the minor (major)
8This is either by assumption, i.e. that if indifferent the expert will provide in the best
interest of the customer, or by referring to the limit of a mixed strategy equilibrium. See
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2008) on this.
8
   
 ph
 
 
c
h
-c
l
 
ph=pl+( ch-cl) 
overtreatment 
       under- 
treatment 
Point Ω 
pl 
Figure 2: Provision Behavior of an Expert with Standard Preferences under
Verifiability
treatment under undertreatment (overtreatment) price vectors. Figure 2
shows in the space of price vectors (ph, pl) the set of vectors that induce ef-
ficient service.9 Those price vectors lie on a line connecting all points where
ph− ch = pl − cl. The line intersects the vertical axis at ph = ch− cl and has
a slope of one. Below this line the expert is induced to always provide low
quality (undertreatment in case the consumer needs th) and above the line
the expert is induced to always provide high quality (overtreatment in case
the consumer needs tl).
Anticipating how experts’ provision (and charging) behavior depends on
price vectors, consumers will accept an equal mark-up vector iff ph ≤ 10, an
9”Point Ω” and of the five price vectors indicated by bullet points in Figure 2 are not
important for the arguments in this section. We will refer to them in Subsection 3.3.
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undertreatment vector iff pl ≤ 3, and an overtreatment vector iff ph ≤ 8.
Thus, to maximize profits, experts will choose ph = 10 and pl = 6 which
will be accepted by an own-money-maximising, risk-neutral consumer. This
leads to the following prediction:
Prediction 1b (Condition V) Assuming standard preferences, experts
post ph = 10 and pl = 6 in condition V and consumers choose to enter
the market and get appropriate treatment (on the equilibrium path). Under
other price vectors customers get either always tl(under undertreatment vec-
tors), or always th (under overtreatment vectors), or always the appropri-
ate treatment (under equal-mark-up vectors) depending on mark-ups (off the
equilibrium path).
We summarize our predictions 1a and 1b in:
Prediction 1 Assume that subjects have standard preferences. Then
in condition N no interaction will take place on the experimental credence
goods market while in condition V all interactions will be carried out and full
efficiency prevails.
2.4 Experimental Results
2.4.1 Aggregate Behavior
Being aware that subjects in experiments often do not behave exactly as
standard theory predicts, we expected to find a difference in the behavior in
conditions N and V, but a less extreme one than in the standard benchmark.
To our surprise we found no difference at all:
Observation 1 (Aggregate Behavior in Conditions N and V) Ver-
ifiability has no significant impact on key variables in the aggregate: The fre-
quency of interaction, the undertreatment rate, the overtreatment rate and
overall efficiency are not significantly different in conditions V and N. The
overall performance in both conditions is better than the standard prediction
for condition N, but worse than the standard prediction for condition V.
Table 1, Figure 3 and Figure 4 support this observation, leading us to
reject Prediction 1. Predictions 1a and 1b also included predictions on off-
equilibrium behavior. Recall that in condition N the undertreatment rate
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should be (close to) one! This is obviously not what we observe: The under-
treatment rate is high (53%) but far from the predicted 100%. Additionally,
it is not significantly higher (and in fact, on average, lower) in condition N
than in condition V.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Conditions N and V
Averages per Period Condition N Condition V
Interaction 0.45 0.50
Efficiencya 0.18 0.16
Undertreatmentb 0.53 0.60
Overtreatmentc 0.06 0.05
Overchargingd 0.88 -
Profits Sellers 2.69 2.58
Profits Customers 1.00 1.06
None of the variables is significantly different between conditions
N and V (using two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests with matching
groups of 8 subjects as one independent observation).
a calculated as (actual average profit — outside option) divided by
(maximal possible average profit — outside option)
b customer needs th, but seller provides tl
c customer needs tl, but seller provides th
d seller provides tl, but charges th (with ph > pl and customer needs tl)
What went wrong in condition V? According to the theoretical prediction
sellers should choose equal mark-up prices. However, such prices are very rare
in condition V - they are chosen in less than 5% of all transactions. Similarly
rare are overtreatment price vectors, i.e. price vectors that provide material
incentives to overtreat the customer (since ph − ch > pl − cl). Most posted
price vectors are of the undertreatment type, i.e. pl − cl > ph − ch.
Table 2 below reports the frequencies of the five most popular price vectors
posted by sellers in conditions N and V. It is interesting to note that in
condition V only one equal mark-up vector, i.e. (4,8), is among the top 5
price vectors, but it is not the predicted one. In both conditions the price
vector (6,8) is by far the most frequently posted price vector. This price
vector splits the gains from trade equally between consumers and sellers - if
sellers always provide the appropriate treatment and charge for the provided
11
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treatment. The prominence of this price vector suggests that a concern for
relative payoffs plays a role for aggregate behavior in the experiment.
Table 2: Most Popular Price Vectors in Conditions N and V
Condition N Condition V
(pl, ph) absolute # rel. frequency (pl, ph) absolute # rel. frequency
(6,8) 176 22.92% (6,8) 265 37.64%
(4,8) 84 10.94% (7,8) 89 12.64%
(5,7) 50 6.51% (5,8) 46 6.53%
(5,8) 44 5.73% (4,8) 17 2.41%
(4,7) 39 5.08% (8,8) 15 2.13%
393 (of 768) 51.17% 432 (of 704) 61.36%
Table 3 shows experts’ provision behavior for the top 5 price vectors in
condition V; more precisely, it shows how aggregate under- and overtreat-
ment rates change in the price difference ph − pl. Note that the sign of the
change in provision behavior is consistent with the direction predicted by
standard theory (for off-the-equilibrium-path behavior): Increasing pl while
keeping ph constant decreases the overtreatment rate and increases the un-
dertreatment rate. However, there are no discontinuous jumps in provision
behavior as predicted by standard theory. Also, the equal mark-up vector
(4,8) induces a considerable amount of overtreatment instead of inducing
appropriate treatment. As we will show later, this is exactly what theories
of inequality aversion would predict independent of the functional form in
which inequality averse preferences are modelled (let alone on specific para-
meterizations of a specific functional form). That is, we will show that any
model of inequality aversion that has the equal split as the reference point
must predict overtreatment under this price vector.
Table 3: Under- and Overtreatment Rates in Condition V
(pl, ph) Overtreatment Rate Undertreatment Rate
(4,8) 37.5% 0%
(5,8) 14.3% 33%
(6,8) 1.25% 53%
(7,8) 0% 65%
(8,8) 0% 100%
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2.4.2 Individual Behavior
We also analyzed the behavior on the individual level.
Observation 2 (Individual Behavior in Conditions N and V) In
both conditions, N and V, there exist two types of experts that exhibit the
same behavior throughout the 16 periods of the game. The first group con-
sists of ’underproviders’. In condition N this group consists of 30% of the
expert population (about 50% if only the behavior in the last ten periods is
considered) and its members always provide low quality and always charge for
high quality. In condition V this group consists of 40% of the subjects (again
50% if only the behavior in the last ten periods is considered) and its members
always choose undertreatment price vectors and always provide low quality.
The second group consists of ’appropriate providers’. In condition N this
group consists of 25% of the expert population, in condition V it consists of
16% of the population. Members of this group always provide the appropriate
quality in both conditions (although they post predominantly undertreatment
vectors in condition V and although they are predicted to undertreat under
each price vector in condition N).
Table 4 illustrates this observation by showing the number of sellers
being classified as those either underproviding all the time or consistently
providing appropriate treatment. A possible explanation for appropriate
treatment even when monetary incentives call for undertreatment is experts
having a taste for efficiency. Another possible explanation is that experts
care for an equitable payoff. Support for the latter hypothesis comes from
the analysis of pricing behavior of different types of experts: In condition
N, more than 50% of the (6,8) price vectors are posted by experts always
providing the appropriate treatment while they make up only 25% of the
population. In condition V more than 20% of the (6,8) price vectors are
posted by experts always providing the appropriate treatment, while they
make up only 16% of the population. Thus, those experts that tend to post
the price vector that splits the gains from trade equally between consumers
and sellers - if sellers always provide the appropriate treatment and charge
for the provided treatment - are more likely to be appropriate-providers than
others. Of course, this is only a very rough indication that distributional
preferences shape behavior. As we will see later, we can say more in an
experiment where price vectors are exogenously imposed.
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Taken together, the evidence from the experiment with endogenously de-
termined price vectors clearly shows both that verifiability does not yield full
efficiency and that it also indicates that non-standard distributional prefer-
ences play a role for experts’ provision and charging behavior.
Table 4: Number and Frequency of Subjects with Consistent
Behavior over all 16 Periods
(in parenthesis values for the last ten periods)
Condition N Condition V
type of behavior absolute # rel. frequency absolute # rel. frequency
underprovision 14 (25) 29(52)% 17 (21) 39(48)%
appropriate provision 12 (12) 25(25)% 7 (8) 16(18)%
3 Identifying Distributional Preferences and
Their Impact on Provision Behavior
The main purpose of this section is to develop a parsimonious experimental
design that allows classifying experimental experts according to their dis-
tributional preferences. In sections 3.1 and 3.2 we illustrate the impact of
distributional preferences on experts’ provision behavior by discussing the
behavioral implications of the two most often invoked types of distributional
preferences, i.e., efficiency concerns (e.g., Charness and Rabin 2002) and in-
equality aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).
This illustration will be followed in Section 3.3 by the key contribution of
this paper, i.e., a rigorous generalization of the impact of distributional pref-
erences on the provision behavior on credence goods markets.
3.1 Preferences for Efficiency
Suppose that (some) sellers derive an extra utility from providing the appro-
priate treatment or that they feel a moral cost if they under- or overtreat a
customer. To explore the consequences of such concerns for provision behav-
ior let us start with a simple linear model. As before, let θ ∈ {l, h} be the
index of a customer’s type of problem, µ ∈ {l, h} the index of the quality
of treatment provided, and κ ∈ {l, h} the index of the quality of treatment
15
charged for. Then the utility of a seller of type (a, b) is assumed to be given
by
Ua,b(p
l, ph, θ, µ) = pκ − cµ − aIθ>µ − bIθ<µ, (3)
where a ≥ 0 is the disutility from undertreating and b ≥ 0 is the disutility
from overtreating a customer. I denotes an indicator variable which takes
the value of one if the condition in the subscript is met and the value of zero
otherwise.10
This utility function has straightforward behavioral implications. First,
consider condition N. If ch−cl, i.e. the additional profit a seller receives from
providing tl when th is needed, is small compared to the expert’s disutility
a from undertreating a customer then the expert will provide the appro-
priate treatment. Overtreatment is never optimal for an expert in N as it
is dominated by overcharging (in comparison to overcharging, overtreatment
decreases the expert’s payoff while leaving the consumer’s payoff unaffected).
By contrast, in condition V the mark-up difference, i.e. (ph− ch)− (pl − cl),
becomes important for experts’ provision behavior. Figure 5 shows the areas
of undertreatment and overtreatment when verifiability applies. Important
for our analysis is that a taste for efficiency predicts appropriate treatment
in a corridor along the equal mark-up line. As is easily verified, this property
is an implication of a taste for efficiency per se; that is, it does not depend on
the specific functional form imposed above (the exact shape of the corridor
does, of course).
3.2 Inequality Averse Preferences
Next we analyze the consequences of inequality aversion for the provision be-
havior on credence goods markets. To illustrate our main points, we assume
(like Fehr and Schmidt 1999) that the utility of a seller of type (α, β) does
not only depend on her own monetary payoff, πs, but also on the payoff of
the consumer, πc :
Uα,β(πs, πc) = πs − α(max{πc − πs, 0})− β(max{πs − πc, 0}). (4)
We also assume that α ≥ β ≥ 0, i.e. a person suffers from inequality and
it suffers more from disadvantageous inequality than from inequality in the
person’s favor; and β < 1, i.e. the seller refrains from wasting money to
10Again, we use the convention that l ≤ h, but not vice versa.
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reduce advantageous inequality because the direct effect on πs is stronger
than the reduced disutility due to a more equal outcome. This is exactly the
two-person version of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
Our main focus is on the case where verifiability holds. For simplicity of
presentation, we concentrate on the case where undertreatment (i.e. provid-
ing tl when th is needed) implies an outcome where the monetary payoff of
the expert exceeds that of the consumer. This restriction seems quite nat-
ural and it translates in our framework to a lower bound on pl, namely to
pl ≥ cl/2.11 Note that this condition is satisfied for the parameter values and
range restrictions implemented in the experiment reported in the previous
section (where pl ≥ 1 and cl = 2).
To characterize the provision behavior of an inequality averse expert it
is useful to subdivide the space of price vectors illustrated in Figure 6 in
four quadrants depending on the sign of the difference in monetary payoffs
of the two trading partners in case of appropriate treatment. In Area A the
expert’s monetary payoff exceeds that of the customer in both cases, when
the customer needs th and appropriately receives th and when he needs tl
and appropriately receives tl. Thus, this area is defined by v − ph < ph − ch
and v − pl < pl − cl. In Area B the expert is better off if she appropriately
provides high quality, but worse off if she appropriately provides low quality.
Hence, this area is defined by v − ph < ph − ch and v − pl > pl − cl. In
Area C the expert is worse off than the customer in both cases. Thus, this
area is defined by v − ph > ph − ch and v − pl > pl − cl. Finally, in Area D
the expert is worse off if she appropriately provides high quality but better
off if she appropriately provides low quality. Thus, this area is defined by
v − ph > ph − ch and v − pl < pl − cl.
Within each area it is straightforward to solve for the provision behavior
of the expert depending on what the consumer needs (details are given in
the supplementary material to this article). Figure 6 shows the combina-
tions of prices that induce an expert to provide the appropriate treatment,
to always provide high quality (overtreatment if the customer needs tl), to
always provide low quality (undertreatment if the customer needs th) and
to always provide exactly the wrong quality (overtreatment if the customer
needs tl AND undertreatment if the customer needs th). The figure reveals
that inequality aversion can lead to a positive or a negative deviation from
11As is easily verified, allowing for pl < cl/2 does not change any of our results - it only
complicates the analysis by making it necessary to consider more (sub-) cases.
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standard theory’s prediction, depending on the price vector under which a
transaction takes place: For some price vectors inequality aversion predicts
appropriate treatment (to reduce advantageous inequality) when own-money
maximization calls for over- or undertreatment (especially in Area A, but
also in parts of areas B and D). For other price vectors inequality aversion
calls for over- and/or undertreatment (to reduce disadvantageous inequality)
when own-money maximization is consistent with providing the appropriate
treatment (especially in Area C, but also in parts of areas B and D). Also
notice that there is a subarea (of Area C; see Footnote 12 on this) where the
expert always provides the wrong treatment, a behavior that is (generically)
inconsistent with standard preferences. Here it is important to note that the
provision behavior of inequality averse experts is qualitatively as depicted in
the figure independently of the magnitude of the parameters α and β.12 We
will argue below that the qualitative features of experts’ provision behavior
and -most importantly- our experimental design in the next section do not
depend on the linearity assumption either. That is, these features are implied
by inequality aversion per se and not by the specific functional form imposed
above.
3.3 A Test for Discriminating Between Different Types
of Distributional Preferences
In this subsection we propose a test for the identification of distributional
preferences that relies on a small set of plausible assumptions. The assump-
tions are that subjects (in the role of experts in the experiment) have prefer-
ences that can be represented by a utility or motivation function of the form
U(πs, πc) satisfying the following three conditions:
• ∂U/∂πs > 0
12In the (linear) Fehr and Schmidt model the picture always looks qualitatively like
Figure 6 for all admissible values of α and β, the only exception being that for high values
of α combined with low values of β —the exact condition being α > β[v− (ch− cl)]/[(ch−
cl) − 2vβ]— the always wrong treatment region enters Area B (implying that the always
appropriate treatment region disappears from Area C). Note that the always wrong region
is necessarily to the lower left of the always appropriate treatment region and that those
two regions necessarily intersect in exactly one point. Also note that the intersection
necessarily occurs to the right of the equal mark-up line. More details are available in the
supplementary material to this article.
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• sign(∂U/∂πc) depends (only) on whether πs > πc, or πs < πc
• ∂U/∂πs > ∂U/∂πc
The first of those assumptions is innocuous, it requires only that — holding
the material payoff of the customer constant — the seller’s utility increases
in own material payoff. The second assumption is both permissive and re-
strictive, depending on the perspective. It is permissive because it allows
for all variants of distributional preferences that have been discussed in the
economics literature, including taste for efficiency, inequality aversion, com-
petitive (or spiteful, or status-seeking) preferences, maximin, quasi-maximin
etc. The second assumption is also restrictive because it implies that prefer-
ences only depend on outcomes, not on the way these are achieved. Among
others, this excludes reciprocity or other intentional motives to play a role
(as is the case in all purely outcome-based models). The third assumption is
fairly plausible for allocations with πs < πc (it seems sensible to assume that
the material payoff of the customer does not have more weight in the expert’s
utility function than her own material payoff when the customer is already
ahead) but might be regarded as restrictive for allocations with πs > πc. This
assumption’s main purpose is to ease the exposition, though, and it can be
relaxed without changing results qualitatively.13 We call an expert :
• SE - selfish iff a) ∂U/∂πc = 0 for πs > πc; and b) ∂U/∂πc = 0 for
πs < πc;
• IA - inequality averse iff a) ∂U/∂πc ≥ 0 for πs > πc; b) ∂U/∂πc ≤ 0
for πs < πc; and c) at least one of the two weak inequalities is strict;
• EL - efficiency loving iff a) ∂U/∂πc ≥ 0 for πs > πc; b) ∂U/∂πc ≥ 0
for πs < πc; and c) at least one of the two weak inequalities is strict;
• CO - competitive iff a) ∂U/∂πc ≤ 0 for πs > πc; b) ∂U/∂πc ≤ 0 for
πs < πc; and c) at least one of the two weak inequalities is strict;
• IL - inequality loving iff a) ∂U/∂πc ≤ 0 for πs > πc; b) ∂U/∂πc ≥ 0
for πs < πc; and c) at least one of the two weak inequalities is strict.
13Technically the purpose of the assumption is to get a unique ”switching point” in the
test proposed below.
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A selfish (SE) seller is a homo oeconomicus according to standard theory,
she simply maximizes her own material payoff. An inequality averse (IA)
expert wants to see the payoff of her customer increased if she is better off
than the customer; but she wants to see the customer’s payoff decreased
if the opposite is the case. An efficiency loving (EL) expert is willing to
give up own monetary payoff to increase the material payoff of her trading
partner if the ’price of giving’ is not too high. A competitive (CO) expert is
willing to give up own material payoff to decrease the payoff of her trading
partner if the ’price of taking’ is not too high.14 An inequality loving (IL)
expert is willing to sacrifice own material payoff to increase the difference
between the payoffs of the two trading partners.15 Figure 7 displays typical
indifference curves of the different types of distributional preferences in the
own-payoff/other-payoff space.
How can we discriminate between the different types of distributional
preferences? In the space of possible price vectors there is exactly one that
allows for a neat discrimination. Looking at Figure 6 it is the price vector at
the intersection of the upward sloping dashed line and the horizontal dashed
line. For future reference we name (the price vector lying at) this intersection
’Point Ω’.
Consider Point Ω and assume that the expert is inequality averse. For
this case Figure 6 (based on the assumption that experts have Fehr/Schmidt
preferences) predicts overtreatment. This is not only true for a certain para-
14A competitive (or spiteful) seller has an incentive to hurt her customer if this is not too
costly for her. Thus, a representation of her provision behavior in the (pl, ph) space would
yield a picture similar to the one for the efficiency loving seller (Figure 5) except that the
corridor along the equal mark-up does not lead to appropriate treatment but to always
wrong provision (that is, a customer with the minor problem gets the major treatment,
while a customer with the major problem gets the minor treatment). In other words,
the green area in Figure 5 would become blue if experts have competitive preferences,
implying that no (”green”) price vectors exist that induce experts of this type to provide
the appropriate treatment.
15Inequality loving (or equality averse) types are included for completeness only; we
do not expect to find many of them (even though Fershtman, Gneezy and List 2009,
show that inequality loving can prevail in competitive settings). A representation of the
provision behavior of an IL type in the (pl, ph) space would yield a picture similar to the
one for the inequality averse seller (Figure 6) except that (i) the green area does not lead
to appropriate treatment but to always wrong provision, (ii) the blue area does not lead
to always wrong provision but to appropriate treatment, and (iii) the intersection point
between the green and the blue area does not occur to the right but rather to the left of
the equal mark-up line.
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inequality averse (IA) efficiency loving (EL)
competitive (CO) inequality loving (IL)
Figure 7: Indifference Curves of SE, IA, EL, CO and IL Types in the Own
Payoffs (Horizontal Axis) and Other-Player’s Payoffs (Vertical Axis) Space
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meter range in the Fehr and Schmidt model, it is not even only true for the
specific (linear) functional form, it is rather implied by the spirit of inequality
aversion per se. To see this point, first notice that along the upward sloping
dashed line (the equal mark-up line) we have ph−pl = ch−cl, while along the
horizontal dashed line we have πc(p
l, ph, θ = h, µ = h, κ = h) = πs(p
l, ph, µ =
h, κ = h)⇐⇒ ph = (v+ch)/2. In words, along the upward sloping dashed line
the expert gets exactly the same material payoff independently of whether she
provides tl or th, while along the horizontal dashed line the expert and the cus-
tomer get exactly the same material payoff if the expert provides th. Thus, at
the intersection of the two lines in Point Ω we have pl = (v+cl)/2−(ch−cl)/2
implying that this point is necessarily to the left of the vertical dashed line
where we have πc(p
l, ph, θ = l, µ = l, κ = l) = πs(p
l, ph, µ = l, κ = l) ⇐⇒
pl = (v + cl)/2.
Now suppose we (as the experimentalists) impose the price vector in Point
Ω and look at an expert’s provision behavior. First assume the customer has
the minor problem. If the expert provides the minor treatment, she induces
a payoff allocation (πs, πc) = (x, y) with x < y, where the strict inequality
follows from the fact that Point Ω is (strictly) to the left of the vertical dashed
line. If the expert provides the major treatment instead, she induces a payoff
allocation (πs, πc) = (x1, x2) with x1 = x (follows from the fact that Point Ω
is on the upward sloping dashed line) and x2 = x (follows from the fact that
Point Ω is on the horizontal dashed line). Thus, inequality aversion dictates
deciding for the second allocation (that is, providing the major treatment to a
customer who has the minor problem) because the own material payoff is the
same in both allocations while disadvantageous inequality is present in the
first but absent in the second allocation. Now assume that the customer has
the major problem. If the expert provides the major treatment, she induces
a payoff allocation (πs, πc) = (x3, x4) with x3 = x1 = x and x4 = x2 = x,
where the equalities follow from the fact that the material payoffs (of both
parties) for providing the major treatment are independent of the type of
problem. If the expert provides the minor treatment instead, she induces a
payoff allocation (πs, πc) = (x5, z) with x5 = x1 = x (follows from the fact
that Point Ω is on the upward sloping dashed line) and x5 = x > z (from
pl ≥ cl/2). Thus, inequality aversion dictates deciding for the first allocation
(that is, providing the major treatment to a customer who has the major
problem) because the own material payoff is the same in both allocations
while advantageous inequality is present in the second allocation but absent
in the first. In sum: Inequality aversion per se (and not only a specific version
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of it) calls for overtreatment in Point Ω.
Performing a similar analysis for the other types of distributional prefer-
ence and noting that y > x > z yields the following prediction:
Prediction 2a (Impartial Distribution Preferences) Consider the
price vector Ω with ph = (v + ch)/2 and ph − ch = pl − cl (and note that the
two equations together imply pl < (v + cl)/2). Under this price vector:
a) appropriate treatment is consistent with selfish preferences and effi-
ciency loving preferences but inconsistent with IA, CO and IL;
b) overtreatment is consistent with selfish preferences and inequality
aversion but inconsistent with EL, CO and IL;
c) undertreatment is consistent with selfish preferences and inequality
loving preferences but inconsistent with IA, CO and EL;
d) always wrong treatment is consistent with selfish preferences and com-
petitive preferences but inconsistent with IA, EL and IL.
Testing the provision behavior under the price vector described in Predic-
tion 2a is like eliciting impartial distributional preferences, because at Point
Ω a seller compares two allocations that yield the same material payoff for
her, but different payoffs for the customer. Thus, deciding for the ”fair”
allocation (whatever is considered fair) does not involve any costs. In the
test suggested in the next section we start with the price vector in Point Ω
and then we change pl slightly, keeping ph constant. In Figure 6 this means
that we move along the horizontal dashed line. In terms of payoff allocations,
moving to the right (left, respectively) of Point Ω means that we increase (de-
crease) x at the cost (for the benefit) of y and x5 at the cost (for the benefit)
of z, while keeping x1 = x2 = x3 = x4 constant. Given our three assumptions
on the utility or motivational function U(πs, πc), what are the implications
of such a change for the provision behavior of sellers with different types of
distributional preferences? First, it implies a kind of monotonicity:
Prediction 2b (Monotonicity) Consider two price vectors, Ω and Ψ.
Suppose that both have the same ph given by phΩ = p
h
Ψ = (v + c
h)/2 but
different pl (pl
Ω
= pl
Ψ
) with pl
Ω
= (v+ ch)/2− (ch− cl) and pl
Ψ
< (v+ cl)/2.
• If plΩ < p
l
Ψ then - keeping the consumer’s type of problem constant -
an expert who provides tl under Ω must provide tl under Ψ.
• If plΩ > p
l
Ψ then - keeping the consumer’s type of problem constant -
an expert who provides th under Ω must provide th under Ψ.
25
Proof. First note that providing th yields the equal material payoff allocation
πs = πc = (v − c
h)/2 independently of the consumer’s type of problem and
independently of whether Ω or Ψ is the relevant contract. By contrast, the
payoff allocation from providing tl depends on both, the type of problem and
the type of contract. Suppose first the consumer needs tl. Then providing tl
under Ω yields πs = (v−c
h)/2 and πc = (v−c
h)/2+(ch−cl), while providing
tl under Ψ yields πs = (v − c
h)/2 + ε and πc = (v − c
h)/2 + (ch − cl) − ε,
where ε > 0 for plΩ < p
l
Ψ and ε < 0 for p
l
Ω > p
l
Ψ . Now suppose the consumer
needs th. Then providing tl under Ω yields πs = (v − c
h)/2 and πc = (v −
ch)/2 + (ch − cl)− v, while providing tl under Ψ yields πs = (v − c
h)/2 + ε
and πc = (v − c
h)/2 + (ch − cl)− v − ε, where ε > 0 for plΩ < p
l
Ψ and ε < 0
for pl
Ω
> pl
Ψ
. It remains to be shown that U(ϕ+ ε, χ− ε) is increasing in ε.
This follows from ∂U/∂πs > ∂U/∂πc for all (ϕ, χ)
Prediction 2a and Prediction 2b together imply the following result:
Prediction 2c (Partial Distribution Preferences) Consider the price
vectors Ω and Ψ as defined in Prediction 2b. Then observing
a) appropriate treatment under Ω and Ψ is only consistent with effi-
ciency loving preferences (but inconsistent with SE, IA, CO and IL);
b) overtreatment under Ω and overtreatment, appropriate treatment or
always wrong treatment under Ψ with plΩ < p
l
Ψ is only consistent with in-
equality aversion (but inconsistent with SE, EL, CO and IL);
c) undertreatment under Ω and undertreatment, appropriate treatment
or always wrong treatment under Ψ with plΩ > p
l
Ψ is only consistent with
inequality loving preferences (but inconsistent with SE, IA, CO and EL);
d) always wrong treatment under Ω and always wrong under Ψ is only
consistent with competitive preferences (but inconsistent with SE, IA, EL
and IL).
To understand Prediction 2c (and the term ’partial’ distribution prefer-
ences) consider an inequity averse seller. From the arguments above we know
that such an expert has to overtreat a customer under price vector Ω. Increas-
ing pl slightly while keeping ph constant creates a tension between a higher
own monetary payoff and more inequality and vice versa for an inequality
averse expert. By deciding for overtreatment or switching to appropriate
treatment (or always wrong treatment) she reveals a positive willingness to
pay for reducing inequality. The argument for sellers with other kinds of
distributional preferences is similar.
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4 Testing for the Presence/Absence of Non-
Standard Preferences
To test for and classify the distributional preferences of sellers, we conducted
a new series of credence goods experiments. In these new experiments, the
timing of the game is exactly the same as in the game described in Section
2 except for the first stage: Instead of letting sellers post their prices them-
selves (which might give rise to endogeneity concerns), we let the (exogenous)
experimental software choose a price vector from the set {(3,8), (4,8), (5,8),
(6,8), (7,8)} with equal probability in each round. This set of vectors has
two characteristics: First and foremost, it includes the equal mark-up vec-
tor Ω characterized in Prediction 2a; and starting form this equal mark-up
vector it varies pl as described in Prediction 2b and Prediction 2c. Second,
this set of price-vectors includes the four most frequently chosen price vec-
tors in condition V, where prices were endogenous (see Table 2). We call
the experimental condition with this (exogenously given) set of price vectors
V-Fix1. In order to check whether the inclusion of the price vector (3,8) -
which had been chosen in condition V in only 2 out of 704 cases - would have
any impact on behavior we also ran another experimental condition where
the exogenously determined price vector was chosen with equal probability
only from the top four price vectors (4,8), (5,8), (6,8), and (7,8). We call this
condition V-Fix2. We ran four sessions with 16 subjects each both in V-Fix1
and V-Fix2. Hence, a total of 128 subjects participated in these new sessions
(with no subject having participated in the sessions reported in Section 2).
Sessions lasted less than 1.5 hours and average earnings were about 15 Euro.
4.1 Aggregate Behavior
As before we start with some details on aggregate behavior. Table 5 reports
the under- and overtreatment rates for the five price vectors. Since we do
not find any significant differences in untertreatment and overtreatment rates
between V-Fix1 and V-Fix2 we provide pooled data from both treatments.
Observation 3 (Aggregate Behavior in Condition V-Fix) First,
the undertreatment and the overtreatment rate are rather high under the equal
mark-up vector (4,8). Second, there is a considerable amount of appropriate
treatment under each price vector. Third, monetary incentives work roughly
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in the direction standard theory predicts: an increase in pl holding ph con-
stant increases the undertreatment rate and decreases the overtreatment rate.
Fourth, there is a non-monotonicity at (6,8): at this price vector both the
undertreatment and the overtreatment rate are (slightly) too low to yield
monotonicity.
Table 5: Under- and Overtreatment Rates in Condition V-Fix
(pl, ph) Undertreatment Rate Overtreatment Rate
(3,8) 3.57% 93.48%
(4,8) 22.11% 41.18%
(5,8) 64.10% 5.26%
(6,8) 63.23% 3.85%
(7,8) 66.07% 4.55%
How can the aggregate behavior be explained? Examining the experimental
results on the individual level helps to answer this question.
4.2 Classifying Individual Behavior
Observation 4 (Individual Behavior in Conditions V-Fix) Less than
a fourth of the experimental sellers act according to standard theory’s pre-
diction: they provide appropriate treatment if and only if they are held indif-
ferent in own-money terms. About a fourth of the seller population displays
behavior that is consistent with a strong taste for efficiency: they provide
appropriate treatment even if own-money maximization calls for over- or un-
dertreatment. About another fifth of sellers shows behavior that is consistent
with strong inequality aversion: they overtreat customers even if this reduces
their own monetary payoff. Adding up strong and weak forms of distribu-
tional preferences indicates that about half of the sellers display behavior that
is consistent with a taste for efficiency, while little more than a fourth of the
sellers display behavior consistent with (strong or weak) inequality aversion.
In the data analysis of individual sellers’ preference types we first looked at
violations of monotonicity according to Prediction 2b. It turns out that 45
out of 64 sellers (70%) behave according to the prediction over all 16 periods
of the experiment. Taking into account that some learning may go on in
early periods, we decided to look in the following at the final 12 periods only
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(i.e., periods 5 to 16) and found that the behavior of 56 out of 64 sellers
(88%) respects the monotonicity condition as defined in Prediction 2b. This
high degree of consistent behavior is encouraging because it suggests that
stable (non-standard) preferences, rather than noise or any kind of confusion
of subjects, drives our findings. Of the 56 sellers whose behavior is consistent
with Prediction 2b, we had to exclude 3 from further analysis due to lack
of data caused by customers’ opting out.16 Table 6 is therefore based on 53
sellers.
Table 6: Classification of Individual Behavior in V-Fix
Type of Behavior strong weak total
EL (efficiency loving) 14 (26.4%) 12 (22.6%) 26 (49.0%)
IA (inequality averse) 10 (18.9%) 4 (7.5%) 14 (26.4%)
CO (competitive) 0 (0%) 3 (5.7%) 3 (5.7%)
IL (inequality loving) 0 (0%) 2 (3.8%) 2 (3.8%)
SE (selfish) 8 (15.1%) 21 (39.6%) 29 (54.7%)
To read Table 6 properly, note that sellers who are classified as either
weak EL, weak IA, weak CO, or weak IL types are also classified as weak SE
types. This has to be the case because weak EL, IA, CO and IL types behave
exactly as the strong version of the respective type as impartial arbitrators
(that is, when there is no trade off between own material payoff and fairness
standard as at Point Ω in Figure 6), but they behave exactly like (strong)
SE types when their own material payoff is at stake.17 Thus, for relative
frequencies (given in parentheses in Table 6) to add up to 100%, one has to
16Recall that we only changed the first stage of the game in the V-Fix conditions. The
second stage, where customers could decide whether or not to interact with a seller — at
exogenously given prices — was also present in the V-Fix conditions. The 3 sellers that
we had to exclude from the further analysis had too few interactions to assign them to
one particular type. Our criteria for inclusion/exclusion were as follows: We included all
experts who have treated under price vector Ω at least one customer needing tl AND at
least one customer needing th. 50 of the 56 sellers were included under this rule. From
the remaining 6 sellers, we included those where the data contained a clear indication
that the expert is of one of the major distributional types (and not of one of the others).
Since only 3 sellers were included under this latter rule and since only 6 seller were at
disposition a change in the criteria of inclusion/exclusion would not have changed our
results qualitatively.
17Formally, the reason is that the weak SE type is the limit of all kinds of distributional
types ”when the weight on the distributional part of the utility function goes to zero”.
Note, however, that the limiting behavior is different for the four non-SE types!
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add either the strong non-SE types and the total number of SE types or the
total number of non-SE types and the number of strong SE types.
An important point is that the behavior of only a minority of individuals
is consistent with standard theory’s assumption that sellers always follow
their monetary incentives and in case of indifference they act in the interest
of customers. Note that less than a fourth of experimental sellers (those in
the category ”weak EL”) act in this manner. This provides an explanation
for both, why equal mark-up vectors do not work as predicted by theory, and
why these price vectors were not chosen in the endogenous pricing conditions.
Another point that can be inferred from Table 6 is that individuals in the
lab are heterogeneous.18 Some sellers care for efficiency, some for ‘equality
of payoffs’, some do not care for the well-being of others (or for efficiency) at
all. An important implication is that while studying aggregate data can give
first evidence and provide ideas for further elaboration, analyzing individual
behavior is important to understand the trade-offs that influence behavior of
subjects on experimental credence goods markets.
5 Conclusions
This paper has started from the observation that - contrary to standard
theory’s predictions - verifiability has no influence on key variables on an
experimental credence goods market: While (standard) theory predicts that
verifiability brings full efficiency whereas the absence of it leads to a market
break down, we have found that the frequency of interaction, the undertreat-
ment rate, the overtreatment rate and overall efficiency are not significantly
different in credence goods markets with and without verifiability. The overall
performance in both conditions has been better than the standard predic-
tion for markets where verifiability is violated, but worse than the standard
prediction for markets where verifiability holds. Furthermore, an analysis
of individual behavior has indicated that non-standard distributional prefer-
ences shape the provision behavior of experts.
Motivated by these findings, we have studied the implications of different
types of distributional preferences for sellers’ provision and charging behavior
in credence goods markets under verifiability. We have found that the impact
18Of course, the same holds true in many other games, such as public goods games
(Fischbacher, Gaechter and Fehr 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2009) or gift-exchange
games (Fehr et al. 1997).
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on market efficiency can be either positive or negative, depending on the
type of distributional preferences and the price vector under which trade
takes place. While given prices may induce some preference types to behave
appropriately, the same prices may induce other types to choose always the
most inefficient strategy. Based on this observation we have identified a single
price vector that allows a clean discrimination between different preference
types using only a minimal set of assumptions. An important feature of
the identified price vector is that the discrimination does not depend on any
functional form or parameterization of the underlying utility or motivational
function. The price vector rather directly tests the key characteristics of
different variants of distributional preferences that have been discussed in
the literature.
Based on our theoretical analysis we have then designed an experiment
that allows for a classification of various distributional preference-types. The
key findings of this experiment (with exogenously determined prices) are the
following: (i) Only a minority (of about 20%) of individuals behave accord-
ing to standard theory’s prediction: they provide appropriate treatment if
and only if they are held indifferent in own-money terms. (ii) About half of
experimental sellers care for efficiency. (iii) Roughly one quarter of sellers
cares for ’equality of payoffs’ of sellers and buyers. (iv) A minority of ex-
perts (of about 5%) have competitive preferences, meaning that they have a
propensity to harm their customers.
Taken together, these findings provide an explanation for both, why veri-
fiability does a poor job in securing efficiency on credence goods markets and
why markets without verifiability perform considerably better than predicted.
The key insight to see this point is that one and the same heterogeneity in
distributional preferences can lead to a positive or a negative deviation from
standard theory’s prediction depending on institutional design and - within
a given design - depending on the price vector under which the transaction
takes place. The positive deviation may arise from efficiency loving or in-
equality averse experts. Efficiency loving experts are willing to provide the
appropriate treatment if the personal cost of doing so is not too high, while
inequality averse experts care for their customers (at a reasonable cost) in the
domain of advantageous inequality. The negative deviation potentially comes
from inequality averse or competitive experts. Inequality averse experts have
a propensity to harm their customers in the domain of disadvantageous in-
equality, while competitive experts are willing to hurt customers if the ’price
for hurting’ is not too high.
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We will argue in the following that the institutional design N is robust
against the negative impact of distributional preferences, but not against the
positive one, while under V the opposite is true. It is important to note
that our arguments do not depend on any assumptions on the distribution
of different social-preference-types in the population (i.e., on which fraction
of subjects exhibits inequality aversion, which fraction a taste for efficiency,
etc.) and on how specific social preferences are modelled. What is important
for our arguments, though, is that there is heterogeneity in preference types.
Consider condition N first. Under this condition the negative conse-
quences of distributional preferences cannot manifest themselves in the mar-
ket outcome since the standard prediction (undertreatment and overcharging
under each price vector) is already a worst case scenario that leaves no room
for deterioration. In other words, experts with negative attitudes towards
customers behave exactly like own-money maximizing experts in condition
N. However, the positive side of distributional preferences immediately man-
ifests itself in a better market outcome than predicted under standard prefer-
ences in the sense that experts provide appropriate treatment despite strong
monetary incentives for undertreatment.
Under condition V, by contrast, we get almost the opposite result (where
the ‘almost’ does not apply along standard theory’s equilibrium path where
experts are predicted to post equal mark-up prices). Under equal mark-up
price vectors the positive effects of distributional preferences cannot mani-
fest themselves in the market outcome as the standard prediction (appropri-
ate treatment independent of the level of mark-ups) is already a best case
scenario. However, the negative effects of distributional preferences easily
manifest themselves in the market outcome because hurting the customer
involves no cost under equal mark-up vectors. This argument does not only
explain the poor performance of equal mark up prices in condition V, it also
explains why equal mark up prices are very rarely chosen in the first place.
Taking the evidence from the N-condition and the V-condition together
we see that the net effect of distributional preferences is positive in condition
N, but negative in condition V, leading to both conditions performing equally
(well or poor) in the aggregate.19
19As we saw in Section 2, more than 90% of the price vectors in the endogenous price
choice condition V were of the undertreatment type. The impact of distributional pref-
erences under undertreatment vectors in condition V is quite similar to the impact of
distributional preferences (under any price vector) in condition N — the only difference
being that the ”price for giving” depends on the price difference between qualities in V
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While the parameter-free classification of subjects according to their dis-
tributional preferences is an interesting and important contribution of the
present paper in itself, important conclusions for credence goods-markets
and, more generally, for markets with asymmetric information can be drawn
from our analysis. An immediate implication is that institutional design
based on the standard assumption of own-money-maximizing subjects yields
bad incentives for a majority of agents. Another implication is that there are
agents that behave appropriately independently of the institutional design.
Taken together these two observations have two important consequences, one
for institutional design, the other for agent selection:
Designing the Right Institutions: What is needed are not perfect institu-
tions for one type of agent, but rather institutions that are robust against the
coexistence of different types of agents. Our results clearly show that veri-
fiability is not such an institution (nor is a market where verifiability does
not apply). By contrast, as Dulleck et al. (2009) have shown, ’liability’ is a
quite robust institution in markets for credence goods.20 ’Liability’ requires
verifiability of ’outcomes’, while ’verifiability’ requires only verifiability of ’in-
puts’. Thus, securing verifiability of outcomes, where possible, might solve
credence goods problems more effectively.
Selecting the Right Agents: Designing robust institutions might be diffi-
cult, though. Imposing liability, for instance, generates other problems or
may be impossible to achieve.21 As a consequence, selecting the ”right”
while it is fixed in N (this difference is a minor one, however, since observed price differ-
ences are typically small): The standard prediction is already a worst case scenario that
leaves no room for deterioration. So the negative part of distributional preferences cannot
have an impact. The positive part, on the other hand, easily manifests itself in the market
outcome. This might explain why the overall performance in the endogenous price choice
experiments is quite similar in both conditions.
20Under liability the negative effects of distributional preferences cannot lead to devia-
tions from the standard prediction since undertreatment is ruled out by design and since
overcharging is already the standard prediction. Hence, only overtreatment remains as a
possible harm to efficiency, but overtreatment (in comparison to overcharging) only re-
duces the expert’s material payoff without affecting that of the customer and is therefore
unattractive for experts independently of their distributional type (provided the expert’s
utility or motivational function U(πs, πc) satisfies ∂U/∂πs > 0, which is quite plausible,
as argued earlier). The positive effects of distributional preferences cannot have a deep
impact either, since the benchmark prediction is already full efficiency — so the only posi-
tive impact can be a distributional one leading to overcharging rates below the predicted
100% (and this is indeed what Dulleck et al. 2009 find in their experiments).
21On the one hand, liability requires a form of verifiability of the outcome. Especially
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agents for jobs involving experts’ services becomes particularly important.
Instead of choosing the best trained doctor, mechanic or computer special-
ists, customers or their representatives should also worry about the attitudes
of these experts towards their customers. Selecting the right agents may
also help to solve problems created by cost uncertainty over inputs: With
cost uncertainty standard theory would predict that verifiability cannot solve
the problems on credence goods markets - a problem ignored in the formal
literature on credence goods thus far. Our results suggest that verifiability
can solve this problem if the ”right” agents are selected: Efficiency loving
experts provide appropriate treatment in a corridor along the equal mark-up
line; that is, even if monetary incentives are not perfectly in line. Hence,
the crucial task of potential employers or buyers is to identify the experts’
distributional, or more generally speaking, social preferences. While a can-
didate’s track record in his CV (through social activities) may provide first
clues, repeated interaction will most likely provide additional evidence on an
expert’s distributional preference-type.
Condensed to a single sentence our results show that good performance
of credence goods markets requires either robust institutions (combined with
arbitrary experts) or ”good” experts (combined with arbitrary institutions).
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1 Introduction
Figure 6 is based on the two person version of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s
model of inequality aversion. Applied to the present context of a credence
goods market, this model assumes that the utility of a seller of type (α, β)
does not only depend on her own monetary payoff πs but also on the payoff
of the consumer, πc:
Uα,β(πs, πc) = πs − α(max{πc − πs, 0})− β(max{πs − πc, 0}), (1)
where α ≥ β ≥ 0 and β < 1. To characterize the provision behavior of an
inequality averse expert in the (pl, ph)-space it is useful to subdivide this
space in 4 areas depending on the sign of the difference in monetary payoffs
of the two trading partners in case of appropriate treatment (as it is done in
the main article). In Area A the expert’s monetary payoff exceeds that of
the customer in both cases, when the customer needs th and appropriately
receives th and when he needs tl and appropriately receives tl. Thus, this
area is defined by v − ph < ph − ch and v − pl < pl − cl. In Area B the
expert is better off if she appropriately provides high quality but worse off
if she appropriately provides low quality. Hence, this area is defined by
v − ph < ph − ch and v − pl > pl − cl. In Area C the expert is worse off than
the customer in both cases, when the customer needs th and appropriately
receives th and when he needs tl and appropriately receives tl. Thus, this
area is defined by v − ph > ph − ch and v − pl > pl − cl. Finally, in Area D
the expert is worse off if she appropriately provides high quality but better
off if she appropriately provides low quality. Thus, this area is defined by
v − ph > ph − ch and v − pl < pl − cl.
For future reference we define
ph =
v + ch
2
2
and
pl =
v + cl
2
2 The Four Areas and Some Comparative Sta-
tics on Provision Behavior
In what follows many paragraphs start with a code of the form (XYZ). This
code refers to the condition that is derived in the paragraph. The first letter
indicates the area considered - A,B,C or D - and the last two letters indi-
cate that either the no undertreatment (NU) or the no overtreatment (NO)
condition is derived. For example, (CNU) is the paragraph deriving the no
undertreatment condition for Area C. The critical value of ph determined by
the condition is stated as a function of pl, for example phCNU(p
l).
In Area A (blue lines in figures S1 and S2 below) the seller is better off
than the customer if she serves the customer appropriately, independently of
the type of treatment the customer needs.
(ANU) The expert will not undertreat (blue dashed line) iff ph − ch −
β(2ph − ch − v) ≥ pl − cl − β(2pl − cl) or
ph ≥ phANU(p
l) = pl +
(1− β)(ch − cl)− βv
1− 2β
.
How does the critical value phANU(p
l) change in α and β? Since in Area
A all decisions lead to advantageous inequality for the seller, phANU(p
l) is inde-
pendent of α. With respect to β : ∂
∂β
( phANU(p
l)) = −
(
v − ch + cl
)
/ (2β − 1)2 <
0, where the last inequality follows from v > ch (for v < ch provision of th
would be inefficient). Furthermore, for β = 0, phANU(p
l) coincides with the
equal mark-up line (ph = pl + ch − cl). Together these findings imply that
phANU(p
l) lies below and to the right of the equal mark-up line for all positive
values of α and β. Referring to Figure S1 note that the black arrows orig-
inating from the dashed blue line and from Point Y show the comparative
statics with respect to β.
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In Figure S1 and Figure S2 we use the following convention: The
direction of a black arrow shows the effects of an increase in β, while the
direction of a red arrow shows the effects of an increase in α. The absence
of a black (red) arrow indicates that the respective phABC(p
l) or the location
of a point does not depend on β (α respectively).
(ANO) The expert will not overtreat (blue solid line) iff: pl−cl−β(2pl−
cl − v) ≥ ph − ch − β(2pl − cl − v) or
ph ≤ phANO(p
l) = pl +
(1− β)(ch − cl)
1− 2β
.
Again this condition does not depend on α and the comparative statics
with respect to β are d
dβ
(phANO(p
l)) = (ch − cl)/ (2β − 1)2 > 0. Furthermore,
for β = 0, phANO(p
l) coincides with the equal mark-up line. Together these
findings imply that for all admissible (α, β) phANO(p
l) lies to the left and above
the equal mark-up line. Here again the arrows in Figure S1 originating from
phANO(p
l) and from Point Z indicate the comparative statics with respect to
α (no impact), β (positive impact; in the sense that phANO(p
l) increases if β
increases).
The critical prices phANU(p
l) and phANO(p
l) determine the expert’s behav-
ior in Area A. Whenever ph ∈ [phANU(p
l), phANO(p
l)] the expert will pro-
vide the appropriate treatment independent of the need of the customer. If
ph < phANU(p
l) the expert will always provide low quality independent of the
customer’s needs; if ph > phANO(p
l) the expert will always provide high qual-
ity independent of the customer’s needs. Note that the width of the area
in which the expert provides the appropriate treatment is increasing in β:
phANO(p
l)− phANU(p
l) = βv/(1− 2β).
Summing up: In Area A the expert’s provision behavior is independent
of α. Furthermore, an expert with β > 0 has a corridor around the equal
mark-up line, where she provides the appropriate treatment, above this cor-
ridor she will overtreat, below the corridor she will undertreat. The width of
the corridor is increasing in β.
In Area B (green line and blue dashed line) an expert providing appro-
priate treatment is better off than the customer if the latter needs th but she
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is worse off if he needs tl.
(BNU) The expert will not undertreat iff ph−ch−β(2ph−ch−v) ≥ pl−
cl−β(2pl−cl), i.e. the condition is identical to (ANU): phBNU(p
l) = phANU(p
l).
Thus the blue dashed line in Figure S1 (and S2) applies to both areas above
ph.
(BNO) The expert will not overtreat (green solid line) iff: pl−cl−α(cl+
v − 2pl) ≥ ph − ch − β(2pl − cl − v) or
ph ≤ phBNO(p
l) =
(1 + 2α)
(1− 2β)
pl +
1
1− 2β
[ch(1− β)− cl(1 + α)− v(α + β)].
The comparative statics are d
dα
(phBNO(p
l)) = 1
2β−1
(
v + cl − 2pl
)
< 0 and
d
dβ
(phBNO(p
l)) = − 1
(2β−1)2
(
v + 2vα + 2clα− 4plα− ch + 2cl − 2pl
)
> 0. The
first inequality (the one in the comparative statics with respect to α) follows
from the fact that in Area B we have pl < pl = (v + cl)/2 and from β <
1
2
. The second inequality follows from the fact that at Point X in figures
S1and S2, defined as the point where phBNO(p
l) = ph we have pl = (v+c
l)
2
−
(ch−cl)
2+4α
independently of β while Point Z in figures S1 and S2, defined as
the point where phANO(p
l) = phBNO(p
l) = v+c
l
2
+ (1−β)(c
h
−cl)
1−2β
, is increasing in
β : d
dβ
(phANO(p
l)) = c
h
−cl
(−1+2β)2
> 0 (see also the discussion of Points X, Y, and
Z below).
Is phBNU(p
l) everywhere to the right and below of phBNO(p
l)? At the right
boundary of Area B (where pl = pl) this is necessarily the case as phANO(p
l) =
phBNO(p
l) and we know from the analysis of Area A that phANO(p
l) > phANU(p
l)
∀pl. At the lower boundary (where ph = ph) this is the case if and only if
(phBNO)
−1(ph) < (phBNU)
−1(ph) which is equivalent to
α < α̂ = β
v − (ch − cl)
(ch − cl)− 2vβ
.
Note that this is the condition given in Footnote 12 of the main article.
Summing up: If α < α̂ then provision behavior of the expert in Area B is
qualitatively as shown in Figure S1, if α > α̂ then it is as shown in Figure S2.
In the former case a triangle limited by ph, pl, and phBNO(p
l) marks the area
where the expert always provides the appropriate treatment and in the rest
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of the area (above and to the left) the expert always provides th. In the latter
case Area B contains regions where the expert always provides appropriate
treatment (small triangle starting from pl and pointing downward), overtreats
(large upper left region), undertreats (lower right region) and always provides
the wrong treatment (small triangle sitting at ph and pointing upwards).
In Area C (red lines) the seller is worse off than the customer if she
provides the appropriate treatment, independently of whether the customer
needs th or tl.
(CNU) The expert will not undertreat (red dashed line) iff: ph − ch −
α(ch + v − 2ph) ≥ pl − cl − β(2pl − cl) or
ph ≥ phCNU(p
l) =
(1− 2β)
(1 + 2α)
pl +
1
1 + 2α
[ch(1 + α)− cl(1− β) + αv].
The comparative statics of this condition with respect to α and β yield:
d
dα
(phCNU(p
l)) = 1
(2α+1)2
(
v − 2clβ + 4plβ − ch + 2cl − 2pl
)
> 0 and d
dβ
(phCNU(p
l))
= − 1
2α+1
(
2pl − cl
)
< 0.
(CNO) The expert will not overtreat (red solid line) iff: pl − cl − α(cl +
v − 2pl) ≥ ph − ch − α(cl + v − 2pl) or
ph ≤ phCNO(p
l) = pl +
(1 + α)(ch − cl)
1 + 2α
This critical value does not depend on β. The comparative statics of this
condition with respect to α yields d
dα
(phCNO(p
l)) = − c
h
−cl
(2α+1)2
< 0.
Summing up: If α < α̂ then provision behavior of the expert in Area
C is qualitatively as given in Figure S1, if α > α̂ then it is qualitatively as
in Figure S2. In the former case Area C contains regions where the expert
always provides appropriate treatment (triangle starting from ph and pointing
downward), overtreats (upper left region), undertreats (lower right region)
and always provides the wrong treatment (triangle starting from the y-axis
and pointing to the upper right boundary of the area). In the latter case the
’always appropriate treatment’ region disappears from Area C.
In Area D (brown line and dashed red line) the expert who provides
appropriate treatment is better off than her customer if he needs tl but she
is worse off if the customer needs th.
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(DNU) The expert will not undertreat (red dashed line) iff: ph − ch −
α(ch + v − 2ph) ≥ pl − cl − β(2pl − cl), i.e. the condition is identical to
the condition in paragraph (CNU). Thus, the expert will not undertreat if
ph ≥ phDNU(p
l) = phCNU(p
l).
(DNO) The expert will not overtreat iff pl − cl − β(2pl − cl − v) ≥
ph − ch − α(v + ch − 2pl) or
ph ≤ phDNO(p
l) =
(1− 2β)
(1 + 2α)
pl +
1
1 + 2α
[ch(1 + α)− cl(1− β) + (α + β)v]
Since phDNO(p
l) = ph + 1
2
ch−cl
1+2α
> ph and d
dpl
(phDNO(p
l)) > 0 this condition
is never binding, the respective line does not enter Area D.
Summing up: If α < α̂ then provision behavior of the expert in Area
D is qualitatively as given in Figure S1 (appropriate treatment in a small
subarea to the left, undertreatment in the rest of the area), if α > α̂ then it
is qualitatively as in Figure S2 (undertreatment everywhere). Overtreatment
is never an issue in Area D.
3 Characterizing the Intersections of the Boundary-
Conditions
In the following we discuss some further characteristics of the diagram that
hold with Fehr and Schmidt preferences independent of the parameters. For
this purpose we define three points in the (pl, ph) space: the intersection
of phBNO(p
l) and phCNO(p
l), the intersection of phANU(p
l) and phCNU(p
l), and
the intersection of phANO(p
l) and phBNO(p
l). See figures S1 and S2 for an
illustration.
Point X: First, we show that the intersection of phBNO(p
l) and phCNO(p
l)
(Point X) always lies on ph. Then we study how changes in α and β affect the
location of this intersection. To see the first part, define p̂l as the pl such that
phBNO(p̂
l) = phCNO(p̂
l). Then p̂l is given as p̂l = (phBNO)
−1(ph) = (v+c
l)
2
− (c
h
−cl)
(2+4α)
and phBNO(p̂
l) = phCNO(p̂
l) = v+c
h
2
. To see the second part, note (phBNO)
−1(ph)
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is independent of β. To study the change of this point in α, first remember
that for α = 0 the point lies on the equal mark-up line. Furthermore, d
dα
(p̂l) =
ch−cl
(1+2α)2
> 0. Thus, Point X moves to the right when α increases. In Figure
S1 this is indicated by the red arrow originating in Point X.
Point Y: We show that the intersection of phANU(p
l) = phBNU(p
l) and
phCNU(p
l) (Point Y) always lies on ph. Then we study how changes in α and
β affect its location. Then we confirm the condition for Point Y lying to the
right of Point X found earlier. To see the first part, define p˜l as the pl such
that phANU(p˜
l) = phCNU(p˜
l). Then p˜l = (phANU)
−1(ph) = 1
2
v+(1−2β)cl−(ch−cl)
1−2β
and
phANU(p˜
l) = phCNU(p˜
l) = v+c
h
2
. To see the second part, note that (phBNO)
−1(ph)
is independent of α. The change of this point in β is given by d
dβ
(p˜l) =
v−(ch−cl)
(−1+2β)2
> 0. Thus, Point Y moves to the right when β increases. In Figure
S1 this is indicated by the black arrow originating in Point Y. Third, note
that Point Y lies to the right of Point X iff p˜l > p̂l, which is equivalent to
α < α̂ = β v−(c
h
−cl)
(ch−cl)−2vβ
.
Point Z: We show that the intersection of phANO(p
l) and phBNO(p
l) (Point
Z) always occurs at pl and that the intersection necessarily lies above ph. Then
we show that it moves upward when β increases and remains unchanged
when α changes. First, solving phANO(p
l) = phBNO(p
l) for pl yields pl =
pl . Furthermore, phANO(p
l) = pl + 1
2
ch−cl
1−2β
. Thus, Point Z lies above pl, is
independent of α and moves upwards in β : d
dβ
(phANO(p
l)) = c
h
−cl
(2β−1)2
> 0.
4 Implications for Provision Behavior
We summarize all our findings in figures S1 and S2. The red and black arrows
indicate the comparative statics results for changes in α (red) and β (black).
If α = β = 0 all lines collapse to the equal mark-up line and points X, Y
and Z are all on this line (Point X and Point Y collapse into a single point in
this degenerate case). X,Y lie at the intersection of the equal mark-up line
with ph and Point Z at the intersection of the equal mark-up line with pl.
If α increases Point Xmoves to the right, while Y and Z remain unaffected.
8
By contrast, if β increases, Point X remains unaffected while Point Y moves
rightward and Point Z upwards. As can easily be seen, increases in β lead to
increases in the area where appropriate treatment is provided. By contrast,
increases in α decrease the area where appropriate treatment is provided.
Preempting the discussion in the next section note that α > 0 and β = 0
corresponds to the borderline case between ”inequality aversion” and ”com-
petitive preferences” (where α ≥ 0 and β ≤ 0): In this borderline case
inequality aversion has only negative consequences for experts’ provision be-
havior. By contrast, α = 0 and β > 0 is the borderline case between ”inequal-
ity aversion” and ”efficiency loving” preferences (where α ≤ 0 and β ≥ 0).
In this borderline case inequality aversion has only positive consequences for
provision behavior.
5 Using the Fehr and Schmidt Model to An-
alyze other Forms of Distributional Prefer-
ences
By lifting the parameter restriction α ≥ β ≥ 0 in the Fehr and Schmidt
model the impact of (linear versions of) other forms of distributional pref-
erences (EL, CO, and IL, see the main article for definitions) on expert’s
provision behavior can also be represented using the same figure. The re-
spective assumptions for the linear (Fehr and Schmidt - FS) versions of the
respective types of distributional preferences on α and β are:
(FS-IA) Inequity Aversion: α ≥ β ≥ 0 and β ≤ 1
2
.
(FS-EL) Efficiency Loving: β ≥ −α ≥ 0 and α ≥ −1
2
and β ≤ 1
2
.
(FS-CO) Competitive (spiteful) Preference: α ≥ −β ≥ 0.
(FS-IL) Inequity Loving: −β ≥ −α ≥ 0 and a > −1
2
.
How does the behavior of a FS-EL expert in the (pl, ph) space look like?
Figure S1 helps to answer this question. Starting from the equal mark-up
line, Point X moves to the left, Point Y to the right and Point Z upward.
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Using the color scheme of the respective areas in Figure 6 of the main article,
the resulting figure has a green corridor (with appropriate treatment) around
the equal mark-up line, a yellow area (overtreatment) above and to the left
of the green area and a red area (undertreatment) below and to the right.
Thus, the resulting figure looks qualitatively as Figure 5 in the main article,
the only difference being that the boundaries of the green corridor can have
kinks.
How does the behavior of a FS-CO expert in the (pl, ph) space look
like? Starting from the equal mark-up line, Point X moves to the right,
Point Y to the left and Point Z downward. Using the color scheme of the
respective areas in Figure 6 of the main article, the resulting figure has a
blue corridor (with always wrong treatment) around the equal mark-up line,
a yellow area (overtreatment) above and to the left of the then blue area
and a red area (undertreatment) below and to the right. Thus, the resulting
figure looks qualitatively the same as Figure 5 in the main article except
that the green area is replaced by a blue area. An immediate implication
is that for competitive preferences there exists no price vector that leads to
provision of the appropriate treatment.
Finally, how does the behavior of a FS-IL expert in the (pl, ph) space look
like? Starting from the equal mark-up line, Point X moves to the left, Point
Y to the right and Point Z upward. Using the color scheme of the respective
areas in Figure 6 of the main article, the resulting figure looks qualitatively
as Figure 6 with two exceptions, a) the green area in Figure 6 becomes blue
while the blue area becomes green; and b) the single point where the green
and the blue area meet is to the left of the equal mark-up line and not to the
right as in Figure 6 of the main article.
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     Figures 
 
 
Figure S1: This diagram assumes α<β(v-(ch-cl)) / ((ch-cl)-2vβ)  and is qualitatively the same 
as Figure 6 in the main document. Red arrows show the comparative statics in α, black 
arrows show the comparative statics in β 
Above the dashed lines the expert does not undertreat. Below solid lines she does not 
overtreat. If a point lies between the two lines and the dashed line is below the solid line, the 
expert provides the appropriate treatment. If a point lies between the two lines and the dashed 
line is above the solid line the expert provides th when tl is needed and tl when th is needed. If 
a point lies below both lines the expert will always provide low quality, independent of the 
customer's need. If a point lies above both lines the expert will always provide high quality, 
independent of the customer's need. 
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Figure S2: The case with α>β(v-(ch-cl)) / ((ch-cl)-2vβ) - using the colour scheme of the main 
article, the blue area extends into area B. 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10 
12 
14 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 p
Point X 
(v+c
l
)/2 
(v+c
h
)/2 
p
h
 
p
l
 
Point Z 
Point Y 
